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ARTICLES
Supreme Court Without a Clue: 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett and the System of Collective
Action and Collective Bargaining Established
by the National Labor Relations Act
KENNETH M. CASEBEER*
[I]t was the appeal of stepping into some black hole in American
culture, with all the American values except one: individualism. And
here, in this black hole, paunchy, middle-aged men, slugging down
cans of beer, come to hold hands, touch each other, and sing "Soli-
darity Forever." O.K., that hardly ever happens, but most people in
this business, somewhere, at some point, see it once, and it is the
damnedest un-American thing you will ever see....
... Solidarity. Union. It is the love, the only love left in this
country, that dare not speak its name.'
The Supreme Court will not speak its name. The Supreme Court
and various National Labor Relations Boards have been engaged for
more than two decades in statutory interpretations of the National Labor
Relations Act2 (as amended, the Labor-Management Relations Act') that
substantially undermine and narrow those statutes.' Recent decisions of
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. This article extends remarks first
offered on Pyett at the Labor Coordinating Committee annual meeting of the AFL-CIO, May
2009.
1. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S
FLAT ON ITS BACK 5, 8 (1991).
2. National Relations Labor Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69) (2006)).
3. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (2006)).
4. "[D]ecisions like Darlington Mills can no longer be considered aberrations from the
common wisdom, cases of judicial temporary insanity. Rather, the case is perhaps the more
shocking example of the continuation of judicial policy making. As in First National
Maintenance, the Court has indicated that there exists a body of inherent managerial interests, an
assumption that not only was reflected in common-law decision making prior to 1935 but that also
underlies NLRA adjudication." JAMEs B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssuMPeroNs IN AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 142 (1983). On the Board and the Supreme Court, see Pattern Makers' League of N.
Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985). On the Board, see Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007);
Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 703 (2001). For earlier judicial narrowing of the statute's protections, see Karl E. Klare,
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the Supreme Court have crossed the line into judicial re-legislation. The
most brazen judicial legislation occurred in the recent case of 14 Penn
Plaza LLC v. Pyett.' Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Alito joined Justice Thomas's majority opinion. The Supreme
Court, in enforcing an express contractual duty to arbitrate union mem-
bers' federal statutory individual rights, has remade the collective-bar-
gaining system in the United States. First, the Court equated collective-
bargaining arbitration with individual employment contract dispute arbi-
tration and antitrust arbitration, thus transforming the role of collective-
bargaining arbitration in ways that ignore bedrock case precedent, while
claiming to rely upon it. Second, it destroyed the doctrine of mandatory
versus permissive subjects of the duty to bargain in good faith. Third, it
shifted the purpose of collective bargaining away from protecting collec-
tive action by workers and toward achieving the aggregated individual
interests of a bare majority of a union's membership, contrary to the
plain language of the statute.' This agenda of individualizing the inter-
pretation and enforcement of the collective-bargaining agreement, and
the system of employer/employee relations built upon such agreements,
ignores both stare decisis and longstanding consensus on the purposes of
federal labor statutes, to the detriment of both employers and
employees.'
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MrsN. L. REv. 265 (1978); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm
in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
5. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). On judicial legislation, see id. at 1475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
On denying employees free choice after Pyett, see Gary Minda & Douglas Klein, The New
Arbitral Paradigm in the Law of Work: How the Proposed Employee Free Choice Act Reinforces
Supreme Court Arbitration Decisions in Denying Free Choice in the Workplace, 2010 MicH. ST.
L. REv. 51 (2010). For a critical view of Pyett analyzing multiple doctrinal issues yet to be
decided, see Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett:
Letting Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OHIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 975 (2010). On the difference between judicial and arbitral forums for statutory
claims, see Eric B. Sposito, 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Into the Abyss Between Judicial Process and
Collectively Bargained Agreements to Arbitrate Individual Statutory Claims, RUTGERS L. REc.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1578623. On the unsuitability of
arbitration for statutory rights with excellent explanation of the doctrinal development of the
support for arbitrating employment rights, see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1017 (1996).
6. "Anglo-American common law historically has defined legal rights as the proprietary
privileges of isolated individuals. The Wagner Act set forth a unique form of right: the collective
entitlement of a body of workers 'to engage in . . . concerted activit[y] for . . . mutual aid or
protection."' Craig Becker, Individual Rights and Collective Action: The Legal History of Trade
Unions in America, 100 HARV. L. REv. 672, 688 (1987) (book review) (alterations in original)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)).
7. "By its statutes, labor relations have been cut loose from the individualistic traditions
which have anchored thinking in the area. It is benignly misguided, but irrevocably wrong, to
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Since the Pyett decision, there has been no reported decision in the
Eleventh Circuit applying that decision to a dispute between a member
of a union and an employer or the member's union. This is not surpris-
ing since such a case would most often reach an Eleventh Circuit court
in an appeal from a decision made by the NLRB on an unfair labor
practice. It is too soon for such cases to have reached the appellate stage.
In the alternative, a federal district court action to enforce provisions of
a collectively bargained contract could be brought under the LMRA,
section 301,8 but very few such actions have been reported anywhere
since Pyett. Such decisions will be coming soon. However, as applied in
a district court decision in the circuit, Campbell v. Pilot Catastrophe
Services, Inc.,' in enforcing an arbitration clause in an individual
employment contract, the disturbing collapse of the same interpretations
of Pyett's reach for arbitration of statutory rights in individual employ-
ment and collectively bargained contracts is assumed. Enforceability and
procedures should be similarly treated if agreed to by the parties. The
Campbell judge claimed that the only distinction in enforceability of
arbitration clauses was the requirement from Wright v. Universal Mari-
time Service Corp.'0 that coverage of statutory claims exclusively
through arbitration in a collectively bargained contract must be "explic-
itly stated."" This implies that all other considerations involved in arbi-
tration should follow the precedents set in cases involving individual
employment contracts. For example, in Campbell, the obligation to arbi-
trate Title VII claims is established from a series of employment con-
tracts entered into by the employee.12 Seemingly, such cumulated duties
could not be the case from a series of collective bargains, and certainly
should not be the result given the negotiations required for collective
bargaining, where agreement to any clause may depend on reaching
agreement on other issues decided in the contract. But such an under-
standing of Pyett within a subsequent district court opinion should not
be surprising, especially given the vagaries of the Supreme Court's opin-
ion and the usual reticence of a district court judge to broadly elaborate
the Supreme Court's language. Whether parallelism is the appropriate
outcome, however, is much more contestable.
Most of the criticism of the Pyett decision and of the earlier
decide labor relations cases wholly in individualistic terms." Robert Brousseau, Toward a Theory
of Rights for the Employment Relation, 56 WASH. L. REv. 1, 24 (1980).
8. Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).
9. No. 10-0095-WS-B, 2010 WL 3306935 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2010).
10. 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (approved of in Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465).
11. Campbell, 2010 WL 3306935, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pyett,
129 S. Ct. at 1465).
12. Id. at *1-5.
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mandatory arbitration upheld in individual employment contracts under
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. " focuses on the damage to
enforcement of Title VII rights. This article does not. Rather, it focuses
on the damage done to the system of collective bargaining itself by
requiring mandatory arbitration of statutory rights under a collective-
bargaining agreement.14 Particularly, in refusing to acknowledge the dif-
ference in federal law between protecting individual rights and protect-
ing rights to collective actions, the Supreme Court ignored the almost
unique quality of federal labor law within American law-that of pro-
tecting group rights-thus contributing to making the experience of soli-
darity almost literally, legally unimaginable."
The suspicion cannot be avoided that this is the Court majority's
intent as part of a related and larger strategy of enforcing rights more
narrowly in order to prevent rights from being used to dismantle system-
atic delegations of governing power to private actors, insulating such
powers from government responsibility in creating such power. The
Court simultaneously insulates the private delegatees in utilizing such
power when they follow market practices, thus encouraging entrench-
ment of social subordination of particular groups. 1 6 Similarly, refusing
to acknowledge solidaristic practices as an important part of mobilizing
effective union bargaining on behalf of a union of workers facing off
against a management representing a union of stockholders undermines
a clearly stated statutory purpose of the National Labor Relations Act,
untouched by the Taft-Hartley revisions of the Act." Prior to the NLRA,
individuals could not effectively bargain for contracts protecting their
13. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
14. This article should not be taken as a blanket endorsement of the present collective-
bargaining system as it has evolved in the United States. Overall, the NLRA represents a weak
and archaic protection of labor organization. This status, however, provides no justification to
emasculate NLRA protections further, as the Supreme Court did in Pyett.
15. See generally James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1563 (1996).
16. Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy of
Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAtH L.
REv. 247 (2000). See particularly the cramped construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976), equating the specific-causation-in-fact standing doctrine to
limits on equitable relief and the substance of rights under § 1983. See also Kenneth M. Casebeer,
Memory Lost: Brown v. Board and the Constitutional Economy of Liberty and Race, 63 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 537 (2009); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REv. 727 (2000).
17. "The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and
tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries." National Labor Relations Act of 1935
§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
[Vol. 65:10631066
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interests when faced with the great inequality of bargaining power pos-
sessed by vast corporations." Only if management were credibly per-
suaded by bargaining demands on behalf of an almost entirely mobilized
and solidaristic workforce would voluntary contract redress power
imbalances affecting the economic health of the entire country.19
In the Pyett case, the plaintiffs were members of the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) representing building cleaners,
porters, and doormen who had a New York City-wide collective-bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) with a voluntarily organized multiemployer
bargaining group called the Realty Advisory Board (RAB).2 0 One of
RAB's members, 14 Penn Plaza LLC, decided to contract out the work-
ers' jobs to an independent company. This necessitated reassigning bar-
gaining-unit members covered by the collective-bargaining agreement to
other jobs. Unit members objected that the new jobs were less well paid
and less desirable. SEIU began a grievance proceeding, demanding arbi-
tration of the dispute that called for submitting all contract claims of
discrimination and all such statutory claims to arbitration under the con-
tract's arbitration clause. Thereafter, the union withdrew its demand for
arbitration. The affected members initiated a claim before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 14 Penn Plaza filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration of the issue under sections 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration
Act.2 1 The Supreme Court held the arbitration of Title VII statutory
claims enforceable under the CBA, despite the fact that the union could
decline to process such arbitration on behalf of its members.2 2
1. COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING ARBITRATION VS. INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Justice Thomas relied on the individual employment contract case,
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,23 for two beginning proposi-
18. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (emphasis added)
("Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no further than to safeguard the right of
employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective
bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer. That is a
fundamental right.").
19. "An integral part of any strike is persuading other employees to withhold their services
and join in making the strike more effective. . . . '[Riespect for the integrity of the picket line may
well be the source of strength of the whole collective bargaining process in which every union
member has a legitimate and protected economic interest."' NLRB v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 646
F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th
Cir.1971)).
20. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct 1456, 1461 (2009).
21. Id. at 1462-63.
22. Id. at 1464.
23. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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tions. First, an individual may waive the right to a judicial forum by
individual employment contract agreement to submit the right to an
independent arbitrator, as long as such forum is adequate to vindicate the
statutory right.2 4 It is not the substantive right that is waived, but only
the right to have it enforced through a court. Second, "[n]othing in the
law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration agreements
signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union repre-
sentative." 2  The only distinction between arbitration clause enforce-
ment in the two types of employment contracts is that, to be enforceable
under a collective bargain, the arbitration clause must explicitly state
that statutory claims are to be covered. At another point, Justice Thomas
asserted that labor arbitrators must be competent to interpret federal stat-
utory law in the Title VII context because commercial arbitrators rou-
tinely interpret more complex antitrust law in arbitrations between
corporations. 26 One-size arbitration fits all.27
That is wrong as a matter of law. The role and prominence of labor
arbitration was the logical extension of the legal enforcement of collec-
tive-worker action envisioned by the provisions of the Wagner Act, and
is still the unquestioned purpose and structure of federal labor law. This
is so in order to redress imbalances in bargaining power necessary to
actual free and voluntary contracting of employees with employers,
which in turn stabilizes production by reducing the catalysts of disputes
and transfers a greater share of the increasing wealth produced by
employing companies to the purchasing power of employees necessary
to sustain national economic health. The Act thus emphasized the public
interest in protecting unions pursuing their members' interests through
contracts negotiated by collective bargaining. This "contractualism" of
labor-management relations in turn would produce industrial peace.
Actual peace then required a dispute-resolution mechanism that would
mediate disputes between employees and their employer over issues and
rights defined by the contract during the course of the contract, usually
under contracts of long duration and anticipated renegotiation and
renewal. Dispute mechanisms matured as multiple-stage negotiation and
discipline by the representatives of labor and management culminated in
neutral arbitration of the contract dispute. The arbitrator must therefore
24. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1471.
27. Labor arbitration is entirely different from commercial or antitrust arbitration, which
usually involves one-shot disputes between parties without an ongoing relationship. "[Labor]
[airbitration is an informal process, voluntarily embraced by parties whose interaction is on-going
and whose relationship is of a relative permanence. The disputes under review are flowing out of a
comprehensive contractual relationship." John E. Dunsford, The Role and Function of the Labor
Arbitrator, 30 Sr. Louis U. L.J. 109, 131 (1985).
[Vol. 65: 10631068
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stay within the letter and intent of the parties so that the aggregate deci-
sions of the arbitrators form the basis of a private or "common law of the
shop"28 as an extension of bargaining itself. The collective bargain was
thus a collective action to be understood as a "constitution of the work-
place and workplace relations," within dynamic contract interpretation
and enforcement. Because of this "constitutive" nature of the collective
bargain, the bargain's inevitable complexity and at the same time open-
ended provisions covering inevitably unforeseen circumstances required
a common law of the shop to fulfill the intent of the parties. Labor arbi-
tration is thus a particular institution keyed to the protection of legiti-
mate collective action necessary to the formation, development,
maturity, and legitimacy of the American system of collective
bargaining.29
Complexity aside, the majority did not understand this important
role of labor arbitrators in enforcing collective-bargaining agreements."o
The collective-bargaining arbitrator serves the purpose of promoting
industrial peace ' under the NLRA by providing an alternative dispute-
resolution procedure to referree disputes between labor and management
during the course of long contracts (two-, three-, or five-year CBAs are
not unusual).32 By this alternative, neither side needs to resort to eco-
nomic leverage, strikes, or lockouts to enforce a contract interpretation it
believes the other side has breached. 33 This is the rationale for the legal
fiction that an arbitration clause in the collective-bargaining agreement
28. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior Gulf & Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
29. On the history of the Wagner Act system of collective bargaining, see, for example,
DAVID BRODY, IN LABOR'S CAUSE: MAIN THEMES ON THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER
237 (1993).
30. "Instead, [collective-bargaining agreements] provide a general code governing wages,
hours and working conditions. This code is refined into specific contract rights through case-by-
case negotiation between the union and employer through the grievance procedure. Deferral of the
refinement to case-by-case negotiation facilitates the reaching of a collective bargaining
agreement by enabling the parties to provide generalized standards governing situations, such as
discipline and discharge, which are likely to be so varied as to make further specificity
impractical." Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of
Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L J. 77, 85 (1996); see Dennis 0. Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and
Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237
(1989).
31. Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 274 (1947); see also Textile Worker Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
454 (1957).
32. In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Supreme Court
explicitly stated that the "fundamental aim" of collective bargaining is "the establishment and
maintenance of industrial peace . . . defusing and channeling conflict between labor and
management." Id. at 674 (footnote omitted). This limiting assumption about collective rights is
itself highly disputed, but for purposes of this section is acknowledged.
33. "Labor arbitration, unlike commercial arbitration, is not a substitute for litigation. It is a
substitute for a strike." Brief for Petitioner at 8, Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (No. 211).
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creates a quid pro quo for a no-strikes agreement to be read into the
agreement, although not mentioned.3 4 Unless the contract explicitly
exempts strikes or limits the issues to be arbitrated, disputes under the
contract are presumed to be arbitrable.
Because the arbitrator is limited to a decision that is arguably an
interpretation of a contract provision, the labor arbitrator is relied upon
not to issue his or her own brand of industrial justice.35 This is true even
though the arbitrator is to use the "common law of the shop" to interpret
provisions, on the ground that the collective-bargaining agreement con-
stitutes not an ordinary contract, but a "constitution of the workplace"
and therefore of employment relations. 36
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties
of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.
The collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship.
It calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particu-
lar industry or a particular plant.
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system
of industrial self-government.
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to
the courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may
indeed be foreign to the competence of courts. A proper conception
of the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public tribunal
imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for
a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a sys-
tem of self-government created by and confined to the parties."
Ordinarily, arbitrators are not to refer to outside statutes to justify
their interpretations of the contract except in helping to enforce the par-
34. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962).
35. Katherine Van Wezel Stone has noted the irony that section 301 law provides for routine
preemption of state-law claims in enforcing broadly interpreted arbitration clauses in a collective-
bargaining agreement precisely because the arbitrator should decide the dispute only under
provisions of the contract without any reference to state law. This is said by the courts to be an
important exclusion in order to support a uniform federal common law of interpreting collective-
bargaining agreements. See Stone, supra note 5, at 1029.
36. See J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1944) ("Collective bargaining between
employer and the representatives of a unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to terms which
will govern hiring and work and pay in that unit. The result is not, however, a contract of
employment except in rare cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no obligation to any
individual ordinarily comes into existence from it alone. The negotiations between union and
management result in what often has been called a trade agreement . . . .").
37. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574, 578-81 (1960)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1070 [Vol. 65:1063
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ties' intended agreement." "The opinion of the arbitrator in this case ...
is ambiguous. It may be read as based solely upon the arbitrator's view
of the requirements of enacted legislation, which would mean that he
exceeded the scope of the submission."" Justice Thomas might respond
that the parties in Pyett incorporated Title VII into their agreement. That
would not be an adequate legal answer, for that response would seem
internally inconsistent with the need to separate the substance of the
right-statutory and not to be decided by contract approval or contrac-
tion-from waiver of the forum to vindicate the right decided by
contract.
Such an approach tells the arbitrator to import the role of "public
tribunal" into the arbitral domain. The natural tendency will be to
increasingly turn to statutes for interpretations of what the parties
intended in other contract clauses defining their relations.4 0 Such a statu-
torily based reading of contract terms undermines the assumption of vir-
tually no judicial review of the arbitrator's substantive interpretation of
the contract.41 Further, arbitration of statutory claims, which would
allow the individual worker to arbitrate if the union decided not to pro-
ceed to arbitration (an option seemingly open after Pyett), could
decrease incentives for both employers and employees to bargain or
attempt to resolve the issue at the pre-arbitration stage of grievance pro-
38. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981).
39. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
40. See generally Minda & Klein, supra note 5.
41. In effect, Pyett subjects an arbitrator's decision interpreting and applying a CBA that
expressly incorporates federal antidiscrimination law to highly deferential review on appeal. See
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1471 n.10 (2009) (arbitrator's decision subject to
limited judicial review under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)). As a result, Pyett directly contradicts the Nance v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2008), majority's interpretation of Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and its progeny by sanctioning limited federal court
review of earlier arbitrated federal antidiscrimination claims. If an arbitrator's actions can directly
limit judicial review of federal antidiscrimination laws, deference to an arbitrator's interpretation
and application of a CBA in a later-filed federal court action is warranted even if that deference
precludes an employee's statutory claims. See Nance, 527 F.3d at 561 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
Therefore, a court affords an arbitrator's decision interpreting and applying the terms of a CBA
"an extraordinary level of deference" in a later Title VII action in federal court and affirms the
decision "so long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority." Crawford Grp., Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard,
P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 2004)); Tewolde v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., No. 07-4075
(DSD/SRN), 2009 WL 1653533, at *9 (D. Minn. June 10, 2009). "The danger is that errors of law
made by arbitrators will go unremedied because the lower federal courts will only vacate those
arbitral awards that display a 'manifest disregard for the law'-the relevant standard for labor
arbitration awards." Minda & Klein, supra note 5, at 84-85 (footnote omitted); see Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397 (1976); see also Wholesale Produce Supply Co.
v. Teamsters Local Union No. 120, No. 02-2911 ADM/AJM, 2002 WL 31655844 (D. Minn. Nov.
22, 2002).
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cedure.4 2 This also interferes with the choice of arbitrator. Some arbitra-
tors formerly chosen for their knowledge of shop and industry may be
foregone in favor of legal specialists.4 3 Antitrust arbitrators interpret the
law; labor arbitrators do not-until now."
Most importantly, labor arbitration has been referred to as an exten-
sion of the collective-bargaining process itself.45 "The processing of dis-
putes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which
meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining agree-
ment. . . . The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process."4 6 Both employer and
employee may bargain on an issue without specifying the exact future
circumstances of a provision's application, secure in the knowledge that
an experienced labor arbitrator will make the provision work for both
parties, favoring neither side in the finding of factual predicates.4 7
Because the collective-bargaining agreement is a private constitution of
the workplace, because the collective-bargaining contract is like a trade
agreement and not a commercial or individual contract, and because the
parties need to rely on arbitrators as extensions of the collective-bargain-
ing process itself, making labor arbitrators substitutes for courts inevita-
bly interferes with longstanding understandings of the NLRA and
42. David L. Gregory & Edward McNamera, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory
Claims, and the Future of Fair Emplyment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
PoL'v 429, 455 (2010). While acknowledging that Pyett has a strong likelihood of radically
altering grievance and other labor-arbitration practices-and reducing their effectiveness in
handling contract disputes-the authors are generally very favorable to the decision. David
Gregory is a frequent labor arbitrator.
43. "In principle anyway, most arbitrators appear to adopt Meltzer's view that their authority
extends only to the business of determining the intent of the parties as reflected in their contract
.... Among these considerations is the fact that arbitrators are not necessarily skilled in deciding
what the law requires in a given case, nor for that matter did the parties choose them for that
purpose." Dunsford, supra note 27, at 121.
44. See Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, No. 07-CV-02097-WDM-KLM, 2009
WL 1231776, at *4-6 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009) (applying res judicata to an arbitrator's
interpretation of Title VII, thus precluding any access to a federal court following an arbitration
under a collective-bargaining agreement after Pyett).
45. See Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective Bargaining
Process, 66 Cm.-KErrr L. REv. 571 (1990).
46. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960);
Dunsford, supra note 27, at 127 ("But as part of the continual collective bargaining relationship,
the arbitrator is surely expected to fill a role different from that of the judge the parties would get
if they went to a court.").
47. "The parties to collective agreements share a degree of mutual interdependence which we
seldom associate with simple contracts. Sooner or later an employer and his employees must strike
some kind of bargain. The costs of disagreement are heavy. The pressure to reach agreement is so
great that the parties are often willing to contract although each knows that the other places a
different meaning upon the words and they share only the common intent to postpone the issue
and take a gamble upon an arbitrator's ruling if decision is required." Archibald Cox, Reflections
Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Hav. L. REv. 1482, 1490-91 (1959) (footnote omitted).
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substantive collective bargaining as it has operated for seventy-five
years.48
II. DESTROYING THE MANDATORY/PERMISSIVE DISTINCTION IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The NLRA requires the employer and the union to bargain in good
faith over issues of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment . .. ." Justice Thomas began his exclusive representation
argument for inclusion of Title VII under disputes governed by the arbi-
tration clause by stating, without elaboration, "[t]his freely negotiated
term between the union and the RAB easily qualifies as a 'conditio[n] of
employment' that is subject to mandatory bargaining under § 159(a)." 0
Thomas then cited without irony Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co. and Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama." For the
majority, apparently any decision of management that could be arbi-
trated if agreed to by the parties is a condition of mandatory bargaining
as part of determining the scope of subjects to be arbitrated.5 2 Justice
Thomas, in fact, later in his opinion, seeking to distinguish Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.," argued that excluding a statutory Title VII claim
"would create a direct conflict with the statutory text, which encourages
the use of arbitration for dispute resolution without imposing any con-
straints on collective bargaining."5 4 Thus, resolution of statutory claims
otherwise outside the contract, when the employer insists on arbitration,
are clearly permissive subjects of bargaining, until they become part of
which decisions of the parties are to be arbitrated; then they become
48. "There are too many people, too many problems, too many unforeseeable contingencies
to make the words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and duties. One cannot reduce all
the rules governing a community like an industrial plant to fifteen or even fifty pages. Within the
sphere of collective bargaining, the institutional characteristics and the governmental nature of the
collective-bargaining process demand a common law of the shop which implements and furnishes
the context of the agreement." Id. at 1498-99; see also Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law
in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d) (2006).
50. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1464 (2009) (second alteration in original)
(Justice Thomas assumes that the substantive issues to be included are also subject to mandatory
bargaining); Util. Vault Co., 345 N.L.R.B. 79 (2005) (holding that the mechanism of contractually
based grievance arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining); see also Litton Fin. Printing
Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
51. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1464.
52. "[T]he arbitration duty is a creature of the collective-bargaining agreement," and the
matter of arbitrability must be determined by reference to the agreement, rather than by
compulsion of law. Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union,
430 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1977).
53. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
54. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465 n.6.
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mandatory. Something of a smoking gun on mandatory bargaining of
arbitration subjects appears in a recent circuit court opinion:
[I]n Mendez v. Starwood Hotels, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of a motion to compel arbitra-
tion based on a letter agreement signed by Starwood and Mendez
because the subject matter of the agreement to arbitrate employment
related discrimination claims was subject to mandatory bargaining
under the NLRA, and the employer had no right to go outside the
collective bargaining context to obtain this letter."
The majority in Pyett continually rested its decision on the Steel-
workers' Trilogy. In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing
Co.,56 whether seniority rights, just-cause dismissal, management rights,
or a comprehensive arbitration clause would decide an issue over a
refusal to rehire a partially disabled employee was decided as a duty to
arbitrate the dispute. The legal issue on appeal by the union was based
solely on the union's right to have the issue heard by an arbitrator. In
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,5 the scope of
the management-rights clause had to be arbitrated because the require-
ment to arbitrate all local disputes under the scope of the arbitration
clause modified the management-rights clause and required arbitration
under the contract of a decision to contract out bargaining-unit work.
Some commentators on Pyett believe that employers will push for
broad arbitration of all potential legal disputes and force unions to agree
in order to make progress on other subjects more core to employee inter-
ests." But what is good for the employer's goose must also be good for
the employee's gander.
Of course, the majority did not refer to Justice Stewart's concur-
rence in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,6 0 long since fol-
lowed as limiting decisions that lie at the "core of entrepreneurial
control"6 1 to permissive subjects of bargaining about which both sides
55. David P. Twomey, The Supreme Court's 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett Decision: Impact and
Fairness Considerations for Collective Bargaining, 61 LAB. L.J. 55, 60-61 (2010) (citation
omitted).
56. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
57. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
58. "Douglas adopted the union's position that a promise to arbitrate contained in a collective
bargaining agreement is enforceable without regard to the court's view of the merits of the
underlying grievance." Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Steelworkers' Trilogy: The Evolution of
Labor Arbitration, in LABOR LAW STORIES 149, 181 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds.,
2005). The Stone chapter clearly connects the union's litigation strategy for extending Lincoln
Mills to the Douglas opinions in the three cases.
59. See Minda & Klein, supra note 5, at 90.
60. 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-80 (1981).
61. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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need to agree to negotiate. Such subjects are substantively permissive
because unions supposedly should not be able to force agreement about
decisions that impact decisions about return on investment but only inci-
dentally affect member job security. Union members nonetheless
increasingly have concerns about such management decisions in the
global economy. Under Pyett, unions can insist on mandatory bargaining
of such decisions to impasse as an issue they want to be submitted to
arbitration, not as to any management-prerogatives clause itself, but as
part of the subjects covered by the arbitration clause.6 2 The subject of
arbitration is, after all, "easily a condition of employment." Furthermore,
Justice Thomas required that inclusion of statutory claims within the
scope of arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement must be
"explicitly stated."63
Now the union, rather than management, will race to bring up a
broad arbitration clause as a mandatory issue that must be bargained to
impasse before other issues can be agreed to. Of course, before Pyett,
permissive issues could, in theory, hold hostage other mandatory issues
in bargaining, but the practice of actually doing so depended upon a
careful calculation of union bargaining leverage and was unlikely to be
insisted upon for very long.' Bringing Gilmer so blithely to Pyett would
seem to bring unions into the ordinary and daily management of the
enterprise. That outcome may be a good thing given the disruptions
caused by the global economy, although this was likely not contem-
plated by the draftsmen of the NLRA,65 nor by a long line of Supreme
Courts.66
III. IGNORING NLRA PROTECTION OF COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS OF WORKERS
The most general protection of employees under the NLRA is the
protection under sections 7 and 8(a)(1) "to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
62. "Yet, arbitration, as the Court itself often reminds us, is 'part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process,' and it is conceptually difficult to separate the obligation to arbitrate from the
obligation to bargain." ATLESON, supra note 4, at 164.
63. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1468 (2009) (quoting Wright v. Universal
Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998)); see also Campbell v. Pilot Catastrophe Servs., Inc., No.
10-0095-WS-B, 2010 WL 3306935, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2010) (citation omitted).
64. See John Thomas Delaney, Donna Sockell & Joel Brockner, Bargaining Effects of the
Mandatory-Permissive Distinction, 27 INDUs. REL. 21 (1988).
65. "A third possible argument, that all proposed subjects were to be considered mandatory,
was generally neither suggested nor discussed." ATLESON, supra note 4, at 119.
66. See Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal Political
Imagination, 97 HARv. L. REv. 475 (1983).
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protection . . . ."67 Thus, the NLRA does not only protect workers
engaged in collective bargaining over a contract, but other collective
actions as well.68 One does not need to be a member of a union to par-
ticipate in protected activities, which may include activities that support
a union action or that involve no union presence at all.
Justice Thomas took a quotation from Justice Marshall in Empo-
rium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization69 Out of
context in his assertion that "[t]his 'principle of majority rule' to which
respondents object is in fact the central premise of the NLRA."70 In fact,
the Marshall quotation following this assertion by Thomas includes the
preface, "'Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the ben-
efits of their collective strength and bargaining power . . . .' "i7 The
central purpose of the NLRA is not now, and has never been, majority
rule per se. Majority rule is simply the mechanism of democracy through
which union members determine the collective actions that they will
commit themselves to as a unit. 72 The central purpose of the NLRA is
the protection of collective actions for mutual aid and protection, includ-
ing union organization and subsequent collective bargaining if so
desired:
The rest know that by their action each one of them assures himself,
in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they are
all then helping, and the solidarity so established is "mutual aid" in
the most literal sense, as nobody doubts. So too of those engaging in
a "sympathetic strike," or secondary boycott; the immediate quarrel
does not itself concern them, but by extending the number of those
who will make the enemy of one the enemy of all, the power of each
is vastly increased. ... It is true that in the past courts often failed to
recognize the interest which each might have in a solidarity so
obtained . . ., but it seems to us that the [Aict has put an end to this. 73
67. National Labor Relations Act of 1936 § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
68. This claim is so commonplace it underlies recent teaching materials on the most important
cases in American labor law: "Workers could gain substantive rights under the NLRA only by
joining together in labor organizations and using their collective economic power to persuade
employers to grant employee rights in collective bargaining agreements... . The entire regime of
individual and group rights is premised on assumptions about the social and economic importance
of collective action." Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk, The Enduring Power of Collective
Rights, in LABOR LAW STORIES, supra note 58, at 1.
69. 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
70. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1472 (2009).
71. Id. (quoting Emporium, 420 U.S. at 62).
72. The effectiveness of their collective strategies will then largely depend on the solidarity of
the group. See David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law:
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1268 (1988).
73. Richard Michael Fischl, Self Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest
Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLum. L. REV. 789, 856 & n.294 (1989)
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Even after the Taft-Hartley revisions in 1947, the right under sec-
tion 7 to refuse to join a union, or to resign from one, is only a right to
opt out of a union. This in no way undermines the right of protected
collective action for those who do decide to join or assist a union.
While the exclusive bargaining agent of the appropriate unit may be
chosen by majority vote, the bargaining representative must represent all
unit members as a unit.7 The union that served only a current majority
would be short-lived before being decertified. The union needs strong
consensus on most issues to convince management to seriously bargain,
instead of betting that it is safe and precipitating a strike-and then
replacing up to half the bargaining unit permanently.7 6 That the union
may not be able to satisfy all members simultaneously, and that the final
agreement is in force only after majority ratification, does not diminish
the fact that the collective-bargaining agreement is on behalf of the col-
lective unit and a result of leverage achieved through collective action.
Justice Thomas is thus part of a solely judicial agenda of individualizing
federal labor law:78
In the name of protecting individual workers' rights to violate their
(alterations in original) (quoting NLRB v. Peter Cailler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503,
505-06 (2d Cir. 1942)).
74. "Union activity, by its very nature, is group activity, and is grounded on the notion that
strength can be garnered from unity, solidarity, and mutual commitment. This concept is of
particular force during a strike, where the individual members of the union draw strength from the
commitments of fellow members, and where the activities carried on by the union rest
fundamentally on the mutual reliance that inheres in the 'pact."' NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd.,
409 U.S. 213, 221 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. "The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more than that of the
group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment
bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the
collective result." J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944) (emphasis added).
76. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (upholding the
replacement of strikers "with others in an effort to carry on the business"); see also NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (prohibiting additional seniority credit for permanent
replacements of strikers).
77. "[T]he law of labor relations is designedly and necessarily anti-individualistic. The
collective interest is made paramount . . . ." Brousseau, supra note 7, at 12.
78. See, e.g., Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1985)
(refusing to uphold union fining of a member who resigned during a strike despite the union's
constitutional agreement not to do so); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 207, 233-37
(1977) (limiting agency fees required of non-members to support collective-bargaining activities
and allowing opt-out of support for political or other activities supportive of the union or unions
generally). Even the duty of the union to fairly represent all members of the unit can be seen in its
enforcement to "fractur[e] the collective entitlement of a body of labor into the aggregated rights
of individual employees to be fairly represented. What had been the union's obligation to an entire
unit became a duty to each member within it." Becker, supra note 6, at 680. Nor is such judicial
revisionism limited to the post-Rehnquist Court. The Burger Court contributed in the lead-up to
Patternmakers. See Granite State Joint Bd., 409 U.S. at 215-18 (prohibiting union's fining of
members during strike).
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contractual agreements, the Court debilitates the right of all workers
to take effective collective action. The conclusion that freedom under
the NLRA means freedom to break a freely made promise to one's
fellow workers after they have relied on that promise to their detri-
ment is not only a notion at odds with the structure and purpose of
our labor law, but is an affront to the autonomy of the American
worker.7
For the Pyett majority, a union gets what it can for members under-
stood as a majority aggregate of the majority's individual interests. This
view of labor law is at odds with a number of statutory provisions and
makes totally unnecessary any goal of solidarity as an experience of
union, particularly, but not solely, a union's last recourse in effective
bargaining leverage-a strike.s0 It is certainly contrary to what most
Americans in favor of unionization think is more important to them than
the highest possible wage rate; that is, dignity and collective voice.81
This is the unkindest cut of all. It creates a judicial veto of an act,
the NLRA, in an opinion repetitiously invoking the absence of congres-
sional language in the ADEA prohibiting arbitration of Title VII or other
statutory claims to justify arbitration. Thus, a collective action is used to
protect a collective union decision not to pursue to arbitration an indi-
vidual's non-waivable statutory right in the name of an individualized
membership organization. This is true even where, as in Pyett, the
union's decision not to arbitrate ends the members' attempt to get a
hearing of any kind for their Title VII right. It is recognized that the
Pyett majority refused to reach any conclusion on whether such mem-
bers not receiving any arbitration could then go to court under Title
79. Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 133 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. "The strike is 'the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal.' It works to foster both collective
bargaining and union democracy-the former by compelling employers to take their workers'
needs seriously, the latter by providing the experience of identity formation and collective action."
Abraham, supra note 72, at 1336 (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181
(1967)). Further, "[iun strike and similar situations, workers, if they are to have any chance of
success, must operate on the basis of a collective identity which overcomes the individuality of
their resources and interests rather than simply aggregating them." Id. at 1287.
81. "Putting aside the particular form of representation that workers favored, the main finding
of the survey was that the vast majority of workers-85% to 90%, depending on the particular
questions-wanted a greater collective say at the workplace than they had. Moreover, most
workers thought that greater representation and voice to employees at their workplace would be
good for their firm as well as for them." RICHARD B. FREEMAN, EcON. POLICY INST., Do
WORKERS STILL WANT UNIONS? MORE THAN EVER 1 (2007), available at http://www.shared
prosperity.org/bpl82/bpl82.pdf. "[A]n August 2005 Hart survey gave the following list of top
concerns: health care costs (35%), jobs going overseas (31%), rising gas prices (29%), raises that
don't keep up with the cost of living (23%), lack of retirement security (14%), and work schedules
interfering with family responsibilities (10%)." Id. (citing Peter D. Hart Research Associates,
Study #7704, AFL-CIO (Aug. 2005), http://www.aflcio.orglaboutus/laborday/upload/toplines.pdf).
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V11 82 ; but nothing in the majority's paeans to arbitration suggests that
such a "union letter to sue"" would not be perverse to the role of arbi-
tration in pursuit of industrial peace or, as now entirely fabricated into
the statute, the pursuit of the avoidance of litigation.
Instead of guaranteeing statutory redress, Justice Thomas insisted
that if the union fails to pursue a member's statutory claim, the union
may have violated its duty of fair representation.84 The abandoned mem-
bers could sue the union instead of being able to pursue a statutory claim
in court. First, such a claim is notoriously hard to prove, depending on a
showing of union conduct that is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith."" Second, the Supreme Court has explicitly authorized a union to
drop an individual's grievance without arbitration if doing so would
advance another legitimate objective of the union or a wider number of
its members. Ironically, in Emporium Capwell, Justice Marshall upheld
the unit's protection of exclusive-representation status and control of
dispute resolution under the CBA, preventing a minority from bargain-
ing independently with management precisely because Title VII pro-
vided potential alternative relief completely independent of the
collective-bargaining process for the minority member's discrimination
claim.86
It is into this judicially re-legislated statute that the Pyett majority's
impossible reading, but not overruling, of Gardner-Denver must be
placed." The CBA must expressly submit not only contract terms
preventing discrimination, but also statutory rights to arbitration in
whatever form called for in the contract.88 This article will not rehearse
at length Justice Souter's dissent demonstrating the majority's mangling
of the case, as accomplished by referencing bits and pieces of it.
Allowing a union to choose whether to arbitrate a Title VII claim or
sacrifice its pursuit in favor of placing its bargaining or contract-enforce-
ment chips on something else of more widespread member enthusiasm
underscores the necessary tension between collective action (NLRA)
and individual protection (Title VII). It is disingenuous to say that Con-
gress did not rewrite the NLRA in passing an ADEA with no mention of
82. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009).
83. If the EEOC does not wish to prosecute a complaint on behalf of an individual under Title
VII, it issues a "right to sue letter" to the complainant.
84. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1473. This is ironic and question-begging given that the duty of fair
representation already may be said to undermine union collective actions. See supra note 78.
85. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
86. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 60-70 (1975).
87. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1479 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. Still, Justice Thomas found it necessary in a footnote to threaten the dissenters that if they
push their reading of Gardner-Denver, the case will be overruled in a future case. See id. at 1469
n.8 (majority opinion).
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prohibiting arbitration, or that a statutory recognition of alternative dis-
pute resolution in order to promote industrial peace under the NLRA
should be read to cover statutory claims entirely to be determined on
merits that could not be modified by a collective bargain.8 9 Nor should
the theoretical possibility of an adequate alternative forum be used to
substantially change the role of labor arbitration as an integral part of a
continual bargaining process. 90
IV. CONCLUSION: SUPREME COURT WITHOUT A CLUE
A bare Supreme Court majority, in discovering the religion of arbi-
tration in Pyett, has, if it is to be believed, summarily altered the system
of labor-management relations in the United States. The role of the
labor arbitrator has been redeployed in contradiction of the reason such
arbitration was desirable and could be trusted by both employers and
employees.91 The mandatory/permissive distinction between bargaining
subjects has been rendered meaningless, much to the coming and pre-
dictable chagrin of employers. Solidarity has been mortally wounded
and with it most of the reason for wanting unions as part of the determi-
nation of employment relations at all.92 Nothing will prevent, not just
the arbitration of discrimination in the workplace, but the arbitration of
89. "There were 'statutory rights related to collective activity,' which 'are conferred on
employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining [, which] properly may be exercised
or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union
members.' But 'Title VII . . . stands on plainly different [categorical] ground; it concerns not
majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities." Id. at 1477
(Souter, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co, 415
U.S. 36, 51 (1974)).
90. Mark Berger has suggested that the union, in agreeing to arbitration of statutory claims,
must remain in charge of what kind of arbitration is to be used, including what procedures are to
be used and the representation provided as part of the collective-bargaining process that was
agreed to in the arbitration clause. Mark Berger A Step Too Far: Pyett and the Compelled
Arbitration of Statutory Claims Under Union-Controlled Labor Contract Procedures, 60
SYRACUSE L. REv 55, 83 (2009); see Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local
Union No. 542, 223 N.L.R.B. 533, 533 (1976) (explaining that even if union provides a lawyer for
an individual's grievance arbitration, the individual cannot direct legal strategy or witnesses
called). It is also unclear whether labor arbitrators have any power to subpoena witnesses. See
Gary Furlong, Fear and Loathing in Labor Arbitration: How Can There Possibly be a Full and
Fair Hearing Unless the Arbitrator Can Subpeona Evidence?, 20 WILLAME-TE L. REV. 535
(1984).
91. Mark Berger suggests the union member who does not want her statutory claim to be
arbitrated has the option of individual employment contract employees; that is, to quit. See Berger,
supra note 90, at 81.
92. "The willingness of individuals prudently and responsibly to make cause with others, to
make some personal sacrifice for the common good even when they may not directly benefit from
it, is the sine qua non for the labor movement. Such habits also are central to the survival of any
democracy." Julius G. Getman & Thomas C. Kohler, The Story of NLRB v. MacKay Radio &
Telegraph Co.: The High Cost of Solidarity, in LABOR LAW STORIES, supra note 58, at 13, 53.
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all federal remedial statutes at issue between employers and employees,
and afortiori, all state-law disputes between employers and employees as
well." The Pyett majority, under Justice Thomas's opinion, has truly
empowered a private constitution, not simply of the workplace, but of
substantial federal and state law replacement as well.94 Such is the price
of ignorance-or was that privatization of law the intent all along?95
93. On the required arbitration of state-law claims, see, for example, Johnson v. Tishman
Speyer Props., L.P., No. 09 Civ. 1959(WHP), 2009 WL 3364038, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009).
On section 301 preemption, see Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Avco Corp.
v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
94. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGs L.J. 1187 (1993).
95. "[A]rbitrators who want to interpret the statutes correctly will have no authoritative
statutory interpretations to look to for guidance. It also means that the law cannot play an
educational role of shaping parties' norms and sense of right and wrong, and therefore it cannot
shape behavior in its shadow." Stone, supra note 5, at 1043 (footnote omitted).
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